After losing to Detroit on June 17 and dropping to 25-40, the Rockies announced what would become the defining topic for the rest of the season – they would switch to a four-man rotation with a 75-pitch limit on the starters. Furthermore, they introduced the concept of paired-pitching into the scheme – where a quasi-starter, or piggyback starter, would come in once the starter hit his pitch limit. He, too, would be on a pitch count, limited to 40-45 pitches so as to be available every three days. This whole idea was concocted by the Rockies’ GM, Dan O’Dowd, on the premise that it would combat the hypothetical effects of altitude adding extra wear on the pitchers and teach pitchers to throw more strikes. What it actually was was an admission that the Rockies’ starting rotation was so atrocious that they’d rather have relievers taking up more innings than continue to trot Jaime Moyer and Jeremy Guthrie to the mound every five days. This deployment of smoke and mirrors is a lot like what we see from our politicians every day and we can’t seem to get rid of any of them.
The hilarious part of this whole story is that by the end of August, people were actually buying what the politician was selling. The Rockies went 18-10 from August 6 to September 4 to fuel a change in many people’s opinions, even though they had gone 12-28 prior to that run. Even some of our own folks here at the Bulletin were starting to be persuaded, though not without a grain of salt.
On August 24, in 3 Up – 3 Down, Ned said, “Maybe, just maybe, the team has stumbled onto the solution to the eternal problem of pitching in Coors Field. And maybe the characterization of this pitching strategy will change from desperate to revolutionary.”
On September 1, again in 3 Up – 3 Down, Kevin stated, “Third, the four-man rotation is working and might even be a good idea.” As I said, giant grains of salt came included in those quotes, but you can see that sane people were grasping at straws when a glint of hope surfaced through the desolation of this season.
In other media outlets, the same thing was happening. On August 27, ESPN’s Michael Bertin said, “Still, the Rockies’ experiment seems to be working for now, if only a little bit.” This was preceded by a deluge of backhanded compliments, but this statement was not made in jest.
On August 30, Troy Renck of the Denver Post wrote: “Since the switch, the Rockies have pitched better. In the first 65 games, the starters were 13-20 with a 6.28 ERA, threatening the 1996 Tigers’ 6.64 ERA as the worst ever. In the last 64 games, they are 11-26 with a 5.61 ERA. The relievers have morphed into part piggybackers, part vultures, increasingly picking up wins. They were 12-10 with a 4.00 ERA before the switch, compared with 17-10 (4.52) since the move.” At this point, Renck’s level of expectations had dropped so far that he was arguing that a 5.61 ERA was a good thing. Decreasing ERA by more than half a run would normally be huge, but not when it still remains the worst in the league. He also fails to acknowledge that the relievers’ ERA had actually gotten worse.
On September 4, in his weekly power rankings, ESPN’s Jonah Keri said: “The Rockies are 40-36 since moving to a four-man rotation, and they’re planning to stick with it next season. There may very well be some merit to the plan, given the notion that fresh relief pitchers often pitch better than gassed starters, not to mention the potential benefit of giving hitters a whole new look sooner in games than they’re used to seeing.” Keri seems to be so delirious at this point that he mistook 30-38 (the Rockies were 55-78 at this point) to be 40-36.
Even players were susceptible to the madness. On August 30, in that same Post article by Renck, piggybacker Adam Ottovino said: “If you get good pitching out of it, and the starters give us four or five innings, then usually we will be in the game. It’s similar to a quality start (six innings, three runs)…We have shown we can win like this.” I suppose this statement is technically true, but the Rockies were losing more than they were winning. Maybe his last sentence was meant to be ironic.
The madness peaked on August 30 when the Rockies announced that the scheme would continue into 2013. The entire Rocky Mountain region groaned in unison, but whichever curse was responsible for this nonsense finally broke on September 14 when Bill Geivett, the new sort-of general manager, announced the team would be returning to a traditional five-man rotation, with pitch counts relaxed to 90-100 pitches. In other words, back to a normal pitching convention. The article by Renck that featured this news also contained this telling quote – “There were also practicality issues. Had the Rockies kept a strict four-man rotation, it would have necessitated mirroring the experiment in Triple-A, preventing fewer pitchers to be available on short notice because of rest issues” – as well as this one – “Rockies players said Friday that they were pleased with the decision to use a more conventional rotation, because the four-man staff had never been fully embraced by pitchers or position players.” So, not only did the players hate the idea, but they would have had a hell of time installing it on the minor league clubs.
As it turns out, Geivett himself never believed in this experiment, stating as much in an interview with Keri back in 2006 when Keri breached the subject of both a paired-pitching and a four-man rotation. Geivett says “Then you get into the tandem starting pitching system (where four pairs of pitchers work on a four-day rotation) and now you have the problem of a guy who throws four shutout innings, then a guy comes in and gets knocked around in the 5th. The appearance of your statistics, the fans’ reaction, players’ reaction, agents’ reaction, these things would be tough to manage. Both of these are certainly creative ideas, things that should be looked at and studied. But putting together a legitimate pitching staff with great balance in terms of starting pitchers getting relatively deep into the game, having a structured bullpen with roles, I think that’s the way to go. I study the game and have respect for everything that went on in the past. There’s a reason why it went from four to five.”
The miracle in all of this is that the Rockies stubbornly stuck with the system through the final three weeks of the season, even after announcing they were done with it. Though, what they stuck with was not a four-man rotation, nor did they strictly adhere to the 75-pitch limit. The only component of the system that made it to the end intact was the paired-pitching/piggyback concept. Thanks to that stubbornness, we have two extra weeks of data for a total of 97 games.
To begin with, many of the Bulletin’s readers, along with several of our writers, noted that the four-man rotation disappeared when Jhoulys Chacin rejoined the team after recovering from an injury and became the fifth man in the rotation. The funny thing is that the four-man rotation wasn’t employed all that much prior to that day. In the 55 games before Chacin returned, Rockies starters only pitched on three days of rest 20 times, or less than half.
Furthermore, the 75-pitch count was also not a strict limit. Rockies starters exceeded 75 pitches 54 times out of 97 games, or more than half. While quite a few of these only exceeded it by a couple of pitches (and the team acknowledged that it wasn’t necessarily an absolute limit), it still shows that the organization isn’t even capable of sticking with their own set of rules. This was just more evidence of how dysfunctional is the Rockies franchise.
The one component they stuck with was the piggybacking concept. However, they don’t deserve much credit for this since the starters commonly hit their pitch limits before the fifth inning, leaving the team with no choice in the matter. Now that the season is over, we can quantify the success of the system.
Back on September 11, Travis Lay laid out a comparison of the starters’ and piggybackers’ stats before and after August 1. He showed that the starters had virtually no change in any numbers, particularly their average number of pitchers per start. However, the most interesting statistic was that the piggybackers’ WHIP’s increased to well over 2.00 (Moscoso’s actually went down to 2.167). This shows that the piggybackers weren’t really providing an improvement over the starters, other than being much luckier in terms of stranding runners.
O’Dowd also claimed that the new scheme would reduce injuries to pitchers, among other things (check out this New York Times article for quotes). Juan Nicasio, Christian Friedrich, and to a lesser extent, Drew Pomeranz (who was given lots of extra days off due to fatigue) all suffered injuries during the experiment. While those injuries can’t be directly attributed to the experiment, it’s definitely a strike against reducing injuries. If anything, it proves that injuries are unique and almost impossible to predict, let alone prevent.
Another reason quoted for the switch was to reduce the number of runs given up. In the 65 traditionally pitched games, the Rockies gave up 373 runs for an average of 5.74 runs per game. In the 97 remaining games, they gave up 506 runs for an average of 5.22 runs. Like those ERA numbers above, it’s an improvement over what they were allowing, but still terrible when compared to the rest of the league.
Finally, the main goal – to win more games. The Rockies were 25-40 when the experiment began and were on pace to finish 62-100 without it. Instead, they went 39-58 the rest of the way to finish at 64-98 (incidentally, 39-58 projects to 64-98 over a full season), gaining two whole wins. While most of us recognize this as no noticeable improvement, I’m sure O’Dowd and the owners (the Monfort brothers) are celebrating their success. Hell, they’re probably in a room right now trying to figure what seven-to-eight pitchers are going to get them to the World Series next year.
Now that we know the system provides no improved success and does not help prevent injuries, we should ask if there is anything to be learned from these 97 games. As it turns out, the results show that the only way to sustain success is for starting pitchers to complete at least five innings – a fact that everyone already knew – which removes the need for piggybackers in the first place. Here is the breakdown of wins by starting pitchers’ innings pitched:
Pre-paired-pitching (25-40)
- Less than 5 IP – 5-15
- 5 IP or more – 20-25
- 6 IP or more – 16-9
Paired-pitching (39-58)
- Less than 5 IP – 21-45
- 5 IP or more – 18-13
- 6 IP or more – 4-3
Interestingly, in those 20 games where the starter pitched on 3-days rest, the Rockies went 9-11 and showed the same splits when comparing innings (less than 5 IP – 3-11; 5 IP or more – 6-3). It’s unfortunate the Rockies were so flaky in instituting the concept as the four-man rotation proved to be the most successful.
After looking at these results, the only conclusion we can come to is that the Rockies need better starting pitchers if they want to win; pitchers that can get through five innings and do it without getting lit up like Guthrie at Coors Field. Until that happens, we can look forward to more smoke and mirrors and snake oil from a politician we can’t even vote out.
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13 comments
Brendan Giles
October 11, 2012 at 4:57 PM (UTC -6)
Sorry to rain on everyone’s parade, but the overarching strategy behind the 4 man rotation is not going anywhere. It was never about forcing pitchers to throw strikes or trying to limit fatigue. It has always been about reducing the starting pitcher’s exposure to the third time through the lineup. Here are triple slash lines across MLB after for a batter facing a starting pitcher for multiple plate appearances:
1st- .247/.310/.393
2nd- .260/.321/.417
3rd- .271/.332/.444
You will have to trust me on this (because I cannot find the data, and I promise I’m not making it up), but the escalation is even more pronounced at Coors Field. Please try to look at the rotation/pitch count hand-waving through the lense of restricting exposure. Tracy Ringolsby has reported that although the four man experiment is going away, the limited exposure aim will remain:
(http://colorado.rockies.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20120914&content_id=38443318&vkey=news_col&c_id=col&tcid=tw_article_38443318)
“The team will continue to use three hybrid relievers, as they refer to a reliever who works on a set schedule and has been called on when a starter gets to a point where he will be facing a lineup for the third time in the game.”
So if the 4 man rotation is not the strategy, where the hell did it come from? If we operate within the paradigm of “limiting exposure” then we can back calculate how the Rockies came to their 4 man/75 pitch thing. An average MLB plate appearance lasts just under 4 pitches. 18 plate appearances constitute 2 times through the lineup and at 4 pitches each yields 72 pitches. Coincidentally close to 75, no? So that is part of where the pitch count comes from. The four man part of the strategy is out of necessity. An average MLB inning takes about 17 pitches. The math then dictates that, given 75 pitches, an average start will last a little over 4 innings. Routinely pulling starters after 4 innings will kill your bullpen, so it requires an additional arm to help out. Because the Rockies restrict themselves to 12 pitchers, this required the number of starters to be reduced so that an extra bullpen arm could be added. Only having 4 starters obviously means that many starts will occur on 3 days rest, and that is the remaining logic behind restricting pitchers to 75 pitches. All nice and tidy in the vacuum of theory, but then that dirty little thing called reality got in the way. First, the Rockies pitchers sucked and would often not even make it through the lineup twice on 75 pitches. Second, the arms (both starters and relievers) started breaking down with the radical change. Therefore, the 4 man rotation was ended and Rockies fans breathed a collective sigh of relief – but there will be no immediate return to convention. The problem is that all of the hand wringing about the stupidity of a 75 pitch count gets caught up in the application without ever considering the strategy itself. The evidence presented above would indicate that the overall strategy is flawed, but I am in favor of seeing more of this “unorthodox” direction. Sure, I would love to have a starting rotation that delivered a quality start 80% of the time, and such a performance would trump any sort of strategical shift. I’m not going to hold my breath. The debate to have is not whether the 4 man rotation is a good idea or not, rather, it should be a discussion about limiting a starting pitcher’s exposure as a strategy and what is the best method to execute it.
Kevin Jordan
October 11, 2012 at 7:14 PM (UTC -6)
The math makes sense, but the concept is unneeded in most cases. As I said, with a 90-100 pitch count, they’re going to be back to a normal use of their staff – in 2009, the average pitch count by starters was 95 (couldn’t find this year’s numbers). With even a modest improvement in the starters next year, piggybackers will rarely get used unless the Rockies go to a bullpen where a piggybacker is allowed to a finish a game; ala Goose Gossage and other 1970′s relievers.
Question – what is the average slash line for the league for batters on their third AB when they face a reliever? Without this data, the argument above is useless as we don’t know if it represents an improvement over the alternative.
We won’t know until next year, but I have a hard time believing they will pull starters who are pitching well and under their pitch counts just because they’re getting to the third time through the order.
The one thing we do know is that if Rockies pitchers can’t pitch through the fifth inning, no strategy is going to keep them from losing again next year.
Brendan Giles
October 12, 2012 at 8:22 AM (UTC -6)
The point about batting stats for facing a reliever is fair, but I think it is reasonable to assume that it is similar to facing a starter for the first time, if not lower, especially in this age of specialization. Even without the data, the argument is no more useless than insisting that the starter pitch until he hits 100 simply for convention’s sake despite the demonstrably increased probability of running into trouble.
As for pulling the pitchers when they are pitching well, you are right that we won’t know until next year. The statement from the front office indicates that they will be pulling pitchers early, but we will see. I agree with you that if a starter is mowing down the lineup (something like less than 5 baserunners after 18 plate appearances – not asking for much) then sure, let him keep going and see if he can defy the odds. What is going to happen the other 100+ games? Managing for the best case scenario is easy. However, the less than stellar performances make up the majority of games and finding a way to be successful in those games is the key.
Where did the 100 pitch limit idea originate in MLB? It has been around for so long now I cannot even remember. I seem to recall arguments about both arm health and performance decline, but I don’t know. It has become some mythical number above reproach. What I do know is that often times pitching statistics are stratified by pitches thrown and that once a pitcher gets over 100, his stats get worse. All the Rockies are doing is stratifying their data on a different variable. The Rockies going to 90-100 pitches does not prove they will be returning to normal use of their staff. It puts it on the table, yes, but it also allows greater flexibility for their application of limiting exposure by not mandating quick hooks on account of a couple of extended ABs.
Kevin Jordan
October 12, 2012 at 10:00 AM (UTC -6)
I think the 100 pitch limit comes from anecdotal evidence. When I was in high school, we routinely threw 100 pitch bullpen sessions once between starts, as directed by our coaches. Given that we were trained to throw 100 pitches, you can see how that manifests itself throughout all leagues.
The Rockies need to read this article from Grantland about pitch counts. http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/8369941/history-shows-washington-nationals-shut-stephen-strasburg-too-soon I think there’s a very strong case to use an early hook when a pitcher has to throw at least 25 pitches in any inning. As the article points out, limiting high stress innings, as well as pitch counts past 120, may be the most important aspect to protecting arms.
If the Rockies have 100+ games of early hooks next year, we’re looking at another 90+ loss season.
JD
October 11, 2012 at 11:55 PM (UTC -6)
Jason Hammel is starting a winner-take-all playoff game in 2012. That is all.
O’Dowd.
Kevin Jordan
October 12, 2012 at 10:01 AM (UTC -6)
You forgot to add “Seth Smith hits a game-tying double in the 9th.”
Kevin Giles
October 12, 2012 at 11:30 AM (UTC -6)
Several things caught my eye:
1) Thank you for putting me in the same group as Jonah Keri. I hope to someday be read and paid like Jonah.
2) Why are people so pissed off about the four-man rotation (I’ll call it piggy-back because it is no longer four-man)? Everytime someone boils the numbers down, the splits between the conventional rotation and the piggy-back rotation are pretty close, with some favoring the piggy-back and some favoring the conventional rotation. That being said, I understand that part of the point of the article is that ownership might keep O’Dowd around, despite him being the architect of the worst team in franchise history, solely because of the piggy-backing idea. In that sense, the piggy-back system blows.
3) Juan Nicasio was injured on June 2, approximately two weeks before any introduction of the piggy-back system.
4) The article says that piggy-backing provides “no improved success.” However, the article points out that the team surrendered fewer runs (an earned run comparison would be more useful here) and had a higher winning percentage (albeit it slim) under the piggy-back system.
My take on the piggy-back system is simple. Having a starting pitcher face a lineup the third time through is not a good thing. The facts make this abundantly clear. However, the benefits of not letting a starter go three times through a lineup might be outweighed by the costs in avoiding it. It’s as simple as that.
I have no idea what piggy-backing does regarding injuries, and it’s crazy that O’Dowd, who happens to not be a medical doctor, can claim that piggy-backing will reduce injuries. Maybe he has a team of hotshot Johns Hopkins doctors studying this. I don’t know how he can claim this. The frustrating part is that the organization applies an extremely mismanaged approach to the system, and probably doesn’t have the personnel, brain power, or legitimacy to pull it off.
Look, O’Dowd needs to be fired. He should have been fired back in the early 2000s. The whole organization should be cleaned out.
Kevin Jordan
October 12, 2012 at 1:34 PM (UTC -6)
The crux of the article is that the piggyback system did not lead to any significant success, as measured by wins, the only thing that matters. Yes, it reduced runs given up, but not to a level that would lead to a winning team. Yes, it increased their win total by two, but still produced (projected) almost 100 losses. Again, not a success, just slightly less terrible than before.
The next argument people will make is that the system will work if they get better pitchers. Except better pitchers will go deeper into games, making the piggybacking unnecessary. Not to mention this argument requires 7-8 average to good starting pitchers for success. You now also have to worry about two pitchers, instead of one, having a good day, to get the game to the end stages, which is a reduction in odds.
The only place for this system is in damage control in games that are high-scoring before the sixth inning, and in most cases, lost already. But again, this is already standard practice throughout baseball. So, basically, the Rockies were in damage control for most of the season. If the best thing we can say at the end of the season is “we kept our pitchers healthy,” then it’s going to be a really long, losing season.
Looking at those slash stats again, OBP is the most important of the 3 in generating runs and there’s only a difference of .02% between 1st and 3rd time through. That means 1 extra baserunner for every 50 PA, or one every 16 & 2/3 innings. This doesn’t seem like a large enough increase to necessitate a change.
So, question back to you or Brendan (or anyone else): The slash stats provided data points, but how many runs got scored as a result, each time through the lineup?
One last thing, is it possible the numbers for the third time through the order are skewed high since pitchers get pulled in the middle of innings and the last guy they faced probably reached base safely? In other words, how often was the last batter faced an out versus getting on base and how often was the last batter the 27th batter faced? There may be a disproportionate number of AB’s from higher in the order, skewing the numbers.
(Good correction on Nicasio)
People are pissed off at the system because on the surface it seems like a failure, and in practice, it actually was a failure. Going forward with it does not inspire any hope for the future.
Brendan Giles
October 12, 2012 at 6:59 PM (UTC -6)
The runs scored question is a good one (and hard to answer!). The challenges are that the splits available from baseball-reference do not incude a lot of data and the sample size for the third time through the lineup (for Rockies starters in 2012) is horribly low. For the data, i included all starts from Francis, Chacin, Friedrich, White, Pomeranz, and Chatwood. To try to weight things appropriately, i summed their collective efforts and calculated runs/plate appearance. This is by no means an accepted stat and i welcome critiques of it. I am not positive what to make of it, but i am currently interpreting it to be nothing more than an indicator of how many runs would be expected from a single plate appearance. not perfect and maybe not even remotely accurate, but it is the best i can come up with right now. here is how it breaks down:
1st: 0.124 runs/plate appearance
2nd: 0.121 runs/plate appearance
3rd: 0.151 runs/plate appearance
The decrease from 2nd to 1st is interesting, and at first glance i would attribute it to the lineup no longer being optiimally contructed (the lead off hitter is not necessarily leading off the inning). The increase upon the 3rd time through is almost 25% and is supportive of the idea of restricting exposure. Again, sample size is a huge issue here with the 3rd time through only including 351 PA while 1st and 2nd both had >900, but it does indicate a trend. My shaky conclusion is this: starting pitchers facing a lineup the third time give up significantly more runs.
As for the system failing, I don’t agree at all. The failed system is the Rockies trying conventional pitching. This has been proven over and over again. All the BS about 2007 or 2009 is treating outliers like they are the standard. Of the 20 seasons played by the Rockies, only 2 have ended with the team finishing in the top half of the NL in ERA: 2007 (8th) and 2009 (8th). it is not like those supposedly dynamo pitching staffs were remotely impressive, but what they do tell us is that simply being average may be enough. The reduced exposure strategy is not going to make the Rockies a top 5 pitching club. No one is arguing that. It might help the staff perform at league average, which is exactly what the very best staffs in club history achieved. Insisting on convention is comfortable, but there is absolutely no evidence for it being any better that trying something new. Pointing at half a season during the worst campaign in club history to say a new strategy is not working is cute, but I point to 20 years of seasons that say convention is the problem not the answer.
Kevin Jordan
October 12, 2012 at 9:53 PM (UTC -6)
Excellent…however, saying 25% change is a little misleading owing to how small the numbers are. It’s a difference of .03 runs per plate appearance, so 1 extra run every 33 plate appearances or 1 every 11 innings. If we assume the third time through the order takes 2 innings, we’re looking at 1 extra run every five games or 32-33 runs per season. This is cute (sorry, couldn’t resist), but doesn’t represent a significant enough change to justify the risks in asking 7-8 eight below average pitchers keep you in games.
The system resulted in 5.22 runs/game, which is 845 runs over a season. The number 1 scoring team in baseball, Texas, scored 808 runs. Texas was also the worst pitching team in the playoffs, giving up 707 runs.
2007 Rockies – Gave up 758 and scored 860.
2009 Rockies – Gave up 715 and scored 804.
2012 – Average run differential for playoff teams = +90; basically what is shown above. In order for the Rockies to be successful (i.e. make the playoffs) they need to score 935 runs (post-humidor high is 860).
I’m not insisting on convention, I’m simply saying that better pitching will cause convention on its own. I get that all we have is 97 games, but it IS all we have. And right now, it says “use me and you lose 98 games a season.”
Maybe the answer lies in a variant where the system is only employed at Coors Field in games that the pitcher is not dominating. Then again, maybe better coaching, better pitch selection and different looks, and better pitch execution by starters is the answer. You point to 20 years of convention as the problem and I point to 20 years of mostly below average pitchers with inept pitching coaches.
Maybe the best thing the Rockies could do is throw a ridiculous amount of money at the Maddux brothers to come coach the pitchers.
Brendan Giles
October 13, 2012 at 8:17 AM (UTC -6)
Percent change may be misleading, but it doesn’t make it false. I thought of another way to look at this “runs/PA” thing and that is to multiply it by 9 to estimate runs expected to score each time through. Here is what happens:
1st: 1.12
2nd: 1.09
3rd: 1.36
Again, the differences appear subtle for any one “game” but extrapolated over 162 games, avoiding the third exposure would save 54 runs. Not amazing, but it is something.
I don’t think that better pitchers/better coaches does justice to the problem. Many pitchers have been in Colorado and struggled, only to leave and have success (Guthrie and Hammel would be convenient examples). The park factor calculation considers both home and visitor performance at a given park and Coors is consistently at the top of park factors for every offensive stat except walks. The problems extend to visitors as well so it is not just the Rockies pitchers.
Not to come off as an O’Dowd surrogate, but I am inclined to believe that Coors Field does present a unique challenge. The history of the Rockies suggests that a staff cannot be built as convention would dictate and find consistent success. Finding a transcendent pitcher could change that, but Verlander is not walking through that door.
We can agree that better pitching/coaching is a good thing and will help regardless of the system. I am just too pessimistic to believe that the quality of pitching can be increased dramatically enough to overcome the challenge.
And BTW, my whole “cute” comment was disrespectful. A little too much Skip Bayless. This is a discussion worth having without me resorting to petty jabs. My apologies.
TroyF
October 12, 2012 at 8:14 PM (UTC -6)
The problem with the “piggy back” four man rotation is as much psychological as it is from a common sense standpoint. here are some of my many issues with it:
1) If you are going to use advanced stats to state your case, go full bore. Until I see Betencourt in a high leverage situation before the 9th inning, you are just making an excuse. Speaking of that. . .
2) That’s all this was. It was an excuse. O”dumbass wanted to show it wasn’t really his fault. Let’s find a scapegoat. Jason Hammel obviously is pitching better in Baltimore because he doesn’t have to deal with the altitude, right? Ummmm. . .. actually, no. he pitched fine with the Rockies, you just didn’t like him. what was Guthrie going to do that was better than Hammel? Hammel threw 170 or more innings three straight years in a Rockies uniform. He wasn’t great, but he had a better makeup for this park than Guthrie did.
3) The players hate it. OK, you are old school, it doesn’t matter, right? Bosses boss, players play. Fine, watch how fast young players try to get the hell out of here. Watch how quickly POSITION players get the hell out of here. You think Tulowitzki would have went a year with that without saying anything? If he’d been healthy this year, there may have been a revolt. For pitchers, wins are important for contract talks. They SHOULD NOT BE, but they are. So lets say this thing worked to perfection. Pick a young starter next year. . . any one you like. I’ll pick Friedrich for the hell of it. Let’s say young Christian averages 4 2/3 innings a start and 75 pitches, with a 2.12 ERA. And after 20 starts, he’s 2-4. you think he’s going to be thrilled? He’s going to want to be on the first bus out, that’s what he wants.
Think about that for a second. You have a system where if it works, the players will hate it and nothing will ever change that. You think it’s a good idea to push on a big league clubhouse?
Sorry, I don’t.
I don’t mind thinking outside the box, I mind idiocy. This was moronic from the start.
(by the way, idiot new GM, so is having your office next to the managers in the clubhouse) For the love of God and everything sacred to the game of baseball, pick a book on management and leadership. I mean, ANY BOOK. Learn how to manage a staff and lead. The concepts are not that hard.
Kevin Jordan
October 13, 2012 at 10:43 AM (UTC -6)
Don’t worry, you don’t sound like O’Dowd when saying Coors Field presents a unique challenge. It’s definitely a factor. O’Dowd just takes it beyond reason. All of the numbers we’ve both put up provide evidence that the system can provide a small amount of help, but it appears that it isn’t close to enough to turn the club around.
Another thing to note (I can’t remember who brought this up recently) is that the Denver Bears and Zephyrs were both successful teams in Denver. Maybe it’s time to quiz those staffs and management.
I’ll just point to the Rangers as a team that turned things around by bringing in a smart coach (Mike Maddux), by an owner who doesn’t put up with excuses (Nolan Ryan), while playing in a hitter friendly park. Yes, they’ve spent money on stars, but that also failed them in the past. I still have faith that better coaching as well as development in the minors is the most important element in improving pitching. I also agree that this system may prove valuable situationally, especially at Coors Field, but not as an overall strategy. Those two things combined might be the real answer.
You bring up an interesting point – in 20 years, how have the Rockies not come up with one great pitcher? Shouldn’t this have happened by accident by now?
Thanks for the conversation. I’ll definitely be watching closely next year, looking for those places where a quick hook makes the most sense.