Continue reading »]]> The Rockies front office has no doubt done little to improve the team so far this offseason.  The question is could they? Have they ignored opportunities to improve the team? I do not believe they have; and this offseason shows the unique challenge the Rockies franchise faces.

Yes the Rockies need pitching. But what free agent pitcher are they missing out on? The Rockies are in the miserable position of being at a huge handicap in signing free agent pitchers. Even if the Rockies were willing to put up significant long term money for a pitcher the price would be steeper for the Rockies. Consider the top free agent starting pitchers in play for more than one year deals according to Jeff Passan’s free agent tracker: Obviously Grienke money is out of the picture. The Rockies making a serious play for Anibal Sanchez? His $80 million payday probably has to go closer to $85 or $90 million for the Rockies to sign him. Edwin Jackson? Would take 4 years $55-60 million dollars. Brandon McCarthy and Scott Baker?  A SP trying to rebuild value after injury would never sign with the Rockies unless they overpaid significantly and guaranteed more years. Ryan Dempster would probably have demanded a 3^rd year to sign with the Rockies, probably at about the same money so a total deal of 3 years, $40 million. Kyle Lohse may not even be a fit for Coors, and the 34 year old will probably be looking for 3 years, $35 million this offseason, so make that 3 years, $40 million for the Rockies.

Beyond this top tier of the FA list it gets awfully difficult to find pitchers who can pitch effectively in the big leagues for the next 2-3 years.  So are any of the above contracts ones you would have wanted the Rockies to give out?  Are the Rockies better off with Sanchez or Jackson in the rotation? Of course.  Is it worth the risk the overpay would require? I don’t know, but it is certainly a difficult quandary for the front office. The team needs pitching but if the Rockies overpay they absolutely must hit the target. Even with MLB-wide revenues increasing this franchise can’t afford an underperforming high paid starter or the dead weight of enduring that dreaded extra year the Rockies might have to offer.  Obviously the Rockies have the Nagle/Hampton affair in their history in regards to hoping an overpay works. The flexibility is just not there to absorb a possible bad signing the way higher revenue teams can.

So what other options to the Rockies have? There are two. Trade for pitching or use homegrown pitching. The Rockies are smack dab in the middle of the latter plan. It is a tenuous position to be in. Of course the talent is there to dream on, but depending on young developing pitching prospects is just simply very hard.  In addition those prospects then have to pitch in Coors Field for their welcome to MLB which can intimidate and change their pitching style and aggressiveness.

Trading for pitching has many of the same issues. The Rockies would want young, cost controlled pitching in a trade so the talented yet unproven prospects the team would receive have the same risks and issues as the homegrown pitchers.  A small number of talented pitching prospects become average or above average starting pitchers.  Given the Rockies handicap in signing free agents the team needs more pitching prospects to increase the odds of developing major league regulars. The team needs to take its risks in trading for more young pitching instead of taking risks on free agent pitchers. The Rockies can lure free agent position players for more reasonable costs, so the team’s strategy should reflect this.

Front office strategy:

• Look to turn value in position players into young cost controlled pitching
• Replace position players with free agents; both short term deals and occasionally long term if there is a fit
• Only consider extending a free agent pitching contract once the team is near contention

What this would look like right now:

• Trade Dexter Fowler. Take Julio Teheran if you can get him from the Braves or Randall Delgado plus other younger arms.
• For 2013 the team could use Carlos Gonzalez in CF. Alternatively if the odd market that has led to Michael Bourn losing a game of musical chairs results in him taking a shorter term contact (3 years) the team could replace (or improve upon) Fowler’s production while adding possible starters.  Part of the money could be made up by trading away Michael Cuddyer.  It comes down to me believing the team has a better chance of getting return on spending money on position players rather than starting pitchers. I believe reasonable contracts to position players in Coors have a better chance of succeeding than overpays for 2^nd tier starting pitchers.
• Consider trading Carlos Gonzalez. Look, you don’t like this. I don’t like this. But consider the Rockies offense without Gonzalez.  It is still a competitive offense. The Rockies offense has been competitive nearly every year. The pitching has not been competitive. Offenses less impressive than the Rockies have obviously made the playoffs frequently over the last decade of baseball.  The offense needs to be sacrificed to some extent to increase the competitiveness of the pitching. Cargo’s contract is team friendly and his age during the contract would deliver a huge return. Texas and Seattle are two teams that could be a fit for Cargo in this offseason.  A deal with Seattle could yield 2-3 very high grade arms. A deal with Texas could bring one high grade arm (Martin Perez) and other position players (Mike Olt or Leonys Martin) that could then be turned around individually to other teams.
• Tyler Colvin could take Cargo’s spot. Or sign Cody Ross (or even Nick Swisher if you want to go big) with the money saved from trading Cargo.

This strategy is of course risky. You are taking known commodities that are producing and trading them for prospects that could flame out. But the flipside is risky as well. Hoping that the current young pitching develops while Cargo and Tulo’s contracts get more expensive could be disastrous as it could lead to overpaying free agent pitchers to try to seize on the Cargo-Tulo prime window.  Restocking the pitching prospects will increase the odds that the Rockies can have a rotation of 5 average or above average pitchers. Right now the young pitchers the team is hoping on are: Drew Pomeranz, Juan Nicasio, Christian Friedrich, Chad Bettis, Tyler Matzek, Tyler Anderson, Edwar Cabrera, Tyler Chatwood, and perhaps the #3 pick in the 2013 draft. That is 9 pitchers. A few of those will get hurt. A few of those will underperform (Alex White). Hopefully a few become solid pitchers. But if that crop also had a few out of the group of Randall Delgado, Martin Perez, Taijuan Walker, Danny Hultzen, or James Paxton, I like the odds to develop a young rotation a lot better.

It is clear that the Rockies have a natural handicap in putting together a pitching staff. In the same way the Mariners or Padres would have to overpay an above average hitter, the Rockies will always have to overpay free agent pitchers.  The team cannot sit by idly and hope that it hits the jackpot with pitching drafting and developing.  Even the best developers of young pitching have a low success rate.  The Rockies cannot hope their group of 9 yields a staff.  There are a few opportunities to acquire some excellent pitching talent and the organization should begin to look to spend most of its free agent money on position players and acquire all of the young cost controlled pitching it can get its hands on.

Is it scary? Of course. Risky? Yep. But what other choice do the Rockies have?

Continue reading »]]> While writing about the four man rotation last week.  I wondered about the medical side of the decision and how that may come into play. So I spoke to Dr. Glenn Fleisig of the American Sports Medicine Institute,one of the foremost experts on biomechanics in the world about the four man and how it relates to the Rockies.  Many thanks to Dr. Fleisig for his time.

(Note: I asked Dr. Fleisig about Coors and altitude affecting pitchers arm health and workload but he declined to discuss it as it is outside of his expertise.)

Brandon Cloud:

The four man rotation doesn’t necessarily change the starting pitcher’s workload, it redistributes it. With a league wide average of about 16 pitches per inning for starters, if a team gives a guy an 85 pitch limit, an average pitcher is going to go 5.25 innings pitched per start, which ends up being 210 IP, 3,398 pitches thrown in the 40 starts a 4 man rotation would give. Would this redistribution of a given amount of pitches help or hurt the health of a pitcher?

Dr. Glenn Fleisig:

I have some opinions; I don’t have concrete answers on this. The things to know here are that you can’t just count the number of pitches or the number of innings. 200 innings pitched this way and that way do not mean the same things. It would be the same thing if it was like a bucket of apples and you kept taking an apple out every time you pitched an inning and either way you would run out of 200 apples, or bullets as they say. But our arms are not that way, the pitchers and their arms are living, breathing people. They are living and what that means is that they get damaged as they do athletic activity and they get repaired when they are resting and recovering. So in an extreme case, pitching one inning a day for 200 days in a row is certainly different than 200 full effort innings on one day. So from an extreme you can’t just add up the numbers, which is you question, do they add up the same? No.

So now the question is which is better, is it beneficial or is it worse? So if you are going to pitch 200 innings, is 110 pitches every 5^th day how does that compare to 85 pitches every 4^th day? Let’s assume we are starting with healthy pitchers with no history of problems. What is happening is that when you pitch, your muscles move your body and your bones, and your ligaments and tendons have to basically withstand the force your muscles made. During this activity, every single pitch, the ligaments and tendons (elbow and shoulder) endure this force and there are microscopic tears. Over the course of 85 or 100 pitches you have more tears after 100 pitches than 85 pitches. The Tommy John ligament and the rotator cuff are essentially like elastic rubber bands. When you pull a rubber band or something elastic really hard it gets to the point where you get permanent little tears in it. That is what is happening in ligaments and tendons. What is happening is that at the 85 pitches you have a few tears and at 100 pitches you have a few more tears. And then when you get the four or five days to rest, including having a bullpen in between, your body is recovering. While your body is recovering those little tears are essentially repairing. You have blood flow and it repairs the tendons and ligaments. (For what it is worth the muscles also get tears but they repair a lot faster, but ligaments and tendons don’t have such great circulation so they are not great at repairing). So the real question is: for getting through a whole season successfully, is that each time you take the ball and go on the mound for the first inning you want to be starting with a clean slate with the ligaments and tendons, you don’t want residual tears from pitching. Because what happens is that if you pitch a good amount one day, and then you don’t rest enough and you go pitch the next time a few days later you start with little tears already and your new tears are going to add onto your existing tears, and then you do it a few days later, and again, and later your elbow or your shoulder is going to snap. You are going to feel it on a bad pitch, but really it was an accumulation that was building up. The little tears from day one and day five, they started adding up.

There is no exact equation saying the damage from 85 pitches takes exactly 4 days to repair and the damage from 115 pitches takes exactly 5 days to repair. There is no exact equation either medically or physiologically or in practice because there is huge variation from one person to another. Some people make good short relievers and can pitch every few days and some guys are starters, and some guys can flip flop back and forth like John Smoltz and some other pitchers that have been converted back and forth, but some guys really struggle converting. Some starting pitchers never do well in the bullpen, they take too long to warm up and things like that. What is happening is that each person’s body is a little different as far as how fast you damage and how fast you repair. What effects it is genetics, if you pick the right parents essentially, and also what you eat and drink, the vitamins you take, etc. That is where steroids come into play, the artificial helper, and what they do is help you heal quicker. How soon again you can pitch depends on your genetic makeup and what you do duringyourdays as far as exercise and nutrition. So the answer is unfortunately, in my experience one pitcher would be better off being in a four man rotation  of 85 pitches and some other guy might be better off with 115 pitches every fifth day.

What the Rockies are trying to do, this trial and error thing is a worthy experiment, because there is no proof that a five day rotation is better, there is no proof the four day rotation is better. It really is trial and error because of all of the things I explained about how ligaments and tendons tear, that is all science but then there is the art and the feel of knowing your individuals and making your system fit best for your individuals.

BC:

As a researcher yourself, how long do you think you would have to do the test for before you could say that the four man rotation might be imperiling the health or that it might be helping since you never know in any given situation whether an injury would have happened anyway under the five man rotation?

Dr. Fleisig:

Scientifically I can tell you that it is preposterous. To prove it would be better, but I would have to set up an experiment where let’s say probably about 200 pitchers in a four man rotation and about 200 pitchers in a five man rotation for a season to see if there is a significant difference. So to have one team do a four man and one team do a five man wont prove anything. It not unlike judging two batters who bat 15 times in a weekend and one goes 7-15 and one goes 3-15, did you really prove that the first guy is the better batter? No. So the sample size of one team doing it for one season is just like a blip, you can’t prove it. So in my opinion, it is worth trying. It is worth trying a four man rotation, it is worth staying with a five man rotation, there is no inherent sign saying one way is better than the other. But if they do it and some guys get hurt or don’t get hurt, it really didn’t prove it right or wrong. The press will say “look you guys messed up or you guys did a good job” but [the team] won’t even know in their heart, and scientifically they won’t know because things happened.

I was interviewed by a Toronto reporter after they had like four guys go down with Tommy John surgery. They asked me “what did they do wrong?”  Maybe they did do something wrong. But maybe they were the blip. So the Rockies doing this; they won’t be able to prove or disprove it was a good decision. But that being said, if they can do it right, I think they are just as good trying a four man as a five man, there is no reason that one way would be better than another, except by habit and that is what everyone else has done.

BC:

So if it was given that the Rockies were going to go with the four man rotation you would not necessarily recommend using a certain pitch count, correct?

Dr. Fleisig:

Dr. [James] Andrews and myself were intimately involved in establishing the pitch count rules in Little League Baseball throughout the country.  But even though we are the scientific background for why there are these pitch count rules, I really believe there should not be a pitch count rule for Major League Baseball, and there isn’t obviously. In a four man or a five man rotation they should definitely utilize pitch counts as one piece of information. And also performance, and ball velocity, and those things should be other pieces of information. And a big piece of information, it’s not mathematical, is the human feel: the feedback from the trainers, the player, and the pitching coach… how is it going, is it struggling of is it going well? That is a very important part which is hard to quantify, certainly for outsiders. And the other part is their mechanics, whether they have good or bad mechanics as they progress. And the other thing that has to change is what they do on the off days of a four or five man rotation. Right now some teams do the bullpen on the second or the third day after the start and the day after they pitch they usually have no throwing. Each team has a little different program. But obviously they would have to change their five day cycle to be a four day cycle and would have to consider what program they want to try with the four man.

Continue reading »]]> This recent piece by Dave Krieger examining the current state of the Rockies front office got me thinking a bit more about the Rockies four man rotation experiment. Not so much the failure of the pitching staff this year but more in terms of a 30,000 foot view of the franchise, perhaps as a GM would look at it. This notion of no pitcher ever having sustained success at Coors and the elevation having a negative effect on health is downright scary; much scarier than the ball carrying further or pitches not breaking as much. Tom Glavine is quoted here saying that he was more sore after a start at Coors. The problem it that it is hard to draw lines between development issues and health issues and the plain fact that many MLB pitchers have spurts of success that are not sustained. But if there is a fundamental health hazard to a pitcher’s arm at altitude, that really is something that is worth instituting an unconventional change.  As Doctor Glenn Fleisig says here a pitcher’s arm is constantly breaking down and repairing over the course of a season. Throw a baseball and your arm breaks down in some manner. Rest your arm and it repairs. Of course keeping a pitcher healthy is some sort of a balancing act of the repairing more or less keeping up with the breaking down.  This is why there is some skepticism of the decision to hold back a healthy Stephen Strasburg at some point this year. If his arm is actually in good health there may be no greater chance of a big one time injury (UCL tear) on October 1^st than on June 1^st. If the Rockies have found or been advised that the Coors Field altitude does either accelerate the breakdown or decelerate the repair than all options should be on the table. In that case, it is possible that a four man rotation could be in the best interest of the Rockies while not making sense for the rest of baseball. The 2012 Rockies pitching has been a mess, beyond what a change to or from the 4 or 5 rotation can help. But it is work considering what benefits the four man rotation could have with a better, more consistent staff.

To begin, the effect of the 4 man rotation is not to change the workload of the 4 starters; it is to redistribute the workload. The top 100 starting pitchers in MLB over the last 5 years (according to fWAR) have averaged 6.24 innings pitched per start. I used this group because it seems to represent a cross section of “competent solid” pitchers. Of course it includes Halladay and Verlander, but also Daisuke Matsuzaka, Erik Bedard, and Randy Wolf- solid yet unspectacular guys.  Over that time the average NL starter used 16.18 pitches per inning. In a conventional 5 man rotation (32 starts) that means the average top 100 pitcher would go 199.68 IP in a season, or 3,231 pitches thrown in season. For the 4 man rotation with solid competent pitchers (40 starts per year), the numbers compare like this:

If 75 pitch limit: 4.64 IP per start (= 185 IP for season, 2,993 pitches thrown in season)

If 80 pitch limit: 4.94 IP per start (= 197 IP for season, 3,187 pitches thrown in season)

If 85 pitch limit: 5.25 IP per start (= 210 IP for season, 3,398 pitches thrown in season)

So for the 4 starters in the rotation, the total season workload is going to be about the same, however the work will be distributed as less strenuous work more often. Or, going back to the medical view: less breakdown in the arm but also less repair time. If the Rockies find that for some reason this is preferable at Coors than it should merit strong consideration.

Beyond the health considerations, the four man rotation is interesting. The reasoning that a stacked team does not go to a 6 man rotation is that it would result in the team’s 6^th best starter is talking innings away from the team’s other 5 superior pitchers. And it has also been generally accepted that pitching every 5 days is the acceptable balance point of a starter being utilized in the most frequent way that also preserves his health. So if a team can go through a whole season of a 4 man rotation remaining healthy it means that the innings that the 5^th starter (inferior to the other 4) are not thrown into the mix for starting games. Of course those innings need to be reallocated, and that theoretically results in adding one or two long men to the bullpen. This is where I think a big benefit may lie. Instead of having a 5^th starter trying to go 6 or so innings, he can pitch every 3-4 days for 2 innings, avoiding batters ever seeing him more than once in a game, which would give him an advantage. It may also decrease the walks of the long man given that they should be able to utilize their 2 or 3 best pitches and feel the need to depend on their 3^rd or 4^th best pitch less often, resulting in better command. So while many have focused on the “times-through-the-order effect” for the starters, I think it is even more beneficial to the man who would have been the 5^th starter, his numbers should figure to be much better than if he were starting in a conventional rotation. The ultimate success of the 4 man rotation is probably most tethered to having two pitchers that perfectly fit the mold of the long man. Think for a moment about Alex White in this role. He would almost never see a batter twice in a game, and he would be able to utilize his sinker more and his lesser developing pitches would be less of a liability.

Here is how the starters will enjoy benefit from the “times-through-the-order effect”. It is certainly real. So far in 2012, MLB league wide shows significant splits between 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd times through the order for starters:

1^st time                                .251/.312/.402

2^nd time                              .260/.321/.418

3^rd time                               .272/.332/.443

The more times a batter sees a pitcher in a game he gets more hits, walks more, and hits for more power. The starters will no doubt benefit in some way from this fact. And the MLB wide 1^st at bat against a reliever is even better than 1^st time against a reliever, let alone a 3^rd at bat against a starter. So far in 2012 MLB batters have batted .242/.318/.380 against a reliever the 1^st time through the order. So the long man could really have a chance to succeed much more than if he were to be a 5^th starter in a conventional rotation.

A few misconceptions have surfaced in regards to the 4 man rotation. One is that it would only work with 4 Nolan Ryans or other titans of durability and deep pitch counts. That is a fallacy. The point is not to rely further on the 4 starters; the point is to more efficiently redistribute their innings over the season.  The Rockies don’t need 4 absolute studs to make the 4 man work, just 4 solid performers, which has been the whole problem.

The problem is that the Rockies may have done this at the worst possible time, trying to combat the rotation being miserable with this change has obviously not been effective. My point is that the four man rotation’s strength may be in the “5^th starter that is not starting and the other longman, and the 2012 Rockies have had an absolute dearth of that this year. In fact, at no point during the 2012 season have the Rockies ever had 4 or 5 competent, performing starters. Therefore the possible benefits of the four man rotation cannot be realized. Consider this though: If the Rockies had a healthy JhoulysChacin, Jorge de la Rosa, and Juan Nicasio, this whole experiment would look a lot different. Consider my ideal 4 man rotation assignments with the Rockies current personnel:

Starters:

JhoulysChacin

Jorge de la Rosa

Juan Nicasio

Drew Pomeranz

Piggy back (long man):

Christian Friedrich

Alex White

Adam Ottavino

Josh Roenicke

Closer:

Rafael Betancourt

Setup men:

Rex Brothers

Matt Belisle

Matt Reynolds

In games where your starter can get you 6 innings, you would use your setup men and closer to finish the game depending on the score situation.

In games where starter goes between 4-6 innings and the team has the lead or is within a few runs, use White and Friedrich as the piggy back

In games where starter goes 3-5 innings and the games is out of reach use Ottavino or Roenicke as the piggy back. These two could also function as set up men or a long man with a lead depending on the staff wide usage patterns during that time.

I would absolutely like to see that experiment in 2013. That would actually be an experiment, whereas this mess in 2012 has just been an attempt to bandage a gaping wound. I can’t believe that I am saying it… but I would actually like to see the 4 man rotation return next season.

Continue reading »]]> Bob Apodaca was hired on October 31^st, 2002 as pitching coach for the Colorado Rockies. That means that by the conclusion of this season he will have overseen the pitching staff for 10 complete seasons. To be sure, he has guided the team to both great successes and sizable failures. Does he deserve a chance to see another few years to develop the young Rockies staff or does he deserve to be a casualty of the Rockies disappointing 2012 campaign?

Apodaca has overseen the staff for a decade. Over that span of time the MLB wide ERA has been 4.30. The NL wide ERA during that span is 4.22. The Colorado Rockies ERA during that time has been 4.75. So for the last decade the Rockies have given up more than an extra half run per game than the NL average. Pitching at home the Rockies have racked up an ERA of 4.92 compared to a 4.56 ERA on the road.

Both supporters and pitchfork bearers of Apodaca admit that he has the most unique pitching coach job in baseball. Pitching at high altitude and the Coors field dimensions combine for a more difficult pitching environment than every other MLB stadium. I have written previously about the exact effects Coors has on a pitched baseball, but let’s look at the exact outcomes of pitching at home and on the road during Apodaca’s tenure:

The pitchers have actually been able to strike out nearly as many batters at home as on the road and the walks are actually less at home.  However as you can see when the ball is put in play it has resulted in more hits and more home runs. We can see from this that there is not a particular thing that Rockies pitchers have struggled with pitching at Coors under Apodaca (like not striking batters out, allowing walks, etc). So I think it is fair to say that we can judge Bob Apodaca on his ability to develop pitchers overall, not his ability to teach them to pitch at Coors, per se.

While Coors field is obviously more difficult to pitch in, the Rockies road statistics are not very impressive. It can be said that the pitching staff has by in large been bad over the last decade because they are bad, not because they pitch half their games at Coors. The NL wide ERA on the road during the span has been 4.43, so the Rockies have still been below average even when not playing at Coors.

Before getting too far, it must be clear that Apodaca has had a large number of” successes”.  Among these are Jorge de la Rosa, Jason Hammel, Aaron Cook, Ubaldo becoming dominant, Matt Belisle, Juan Nicasio, Jason Marquis, and many more.  However, he has also had his share of failures.

So let’s look at what Apodaca has been facing and why the Rockies pitchers have not performed well.

For one, the Rockies did not have much talent when Apodaca took over as pitching coach. The Rockies were 300-348 in the 4 seasons (1999-2002) that preceded Apodaca being hired. The 5 pitchers that threw the most innings in the first 3 years of the Apodaca administration (2003-2005) were Jason Jennings, Aaron Cook, Shawn Chacon, Joe Kennedy, and Jamey Wright. Not an embarrassing staff but also nothing near loaded. Despite the humidor being in existence during that time the Rockies staff had the worst ERA in the NL in that 3 year span. So this is certainly one reason.

Another reason the Rockies pitching has not fared well during Apodaca’s tenure is the lack of any pitchers who went from promising young arm to consistent, reliable performer. I count only one: Aaron Cook. There are numerous different reasons this has happened including: injuries, non-performance, trades, and the nature of baseball.  Let’s chronicle them:

Jason Jennings

• 2002 Rookie of the Year
• Never again matched his strikeout or walk rates from his rookie season, performed ok until being traded in 2006

Shawn Chacon

• Very good 2003 season, terrible 2004 season, traded in 2005

Jeff Francis

• Good 2006 and 2007 seasons (3.6 and 4.1 WAR respectively)
• Struggled with injuries in 2008 and 2009, been below average MLB starter since

Jason Hirsh

• Won AA Texas League pitcher of the year in 2005, AAA Pacific Coast League pitcher of the year in 2006
• Baseball America #42 prospect in baseball heading into 2007 season
• Started 20 games for the Rockies
• Struggled with injuries and never became effective MLB starter

Franklin Morales

• Made promising debut in 2007
• Baseball America #8 prospect in all of baseball heading into 2008 season
• Struggled in 2008 as a starter, spent most of the year in AAA
• Was converted to a reliever in 2009, traded in 2010 and been marginally effective as a reliever since

Ubaldo Jimenez

• Made promising debut in 2007, progressed in 2008 into excellent pitcher
• 2009 and 2010 was a dominant MLB pitcher
• Took huge step back in 2011, lost 3 MPH on his fastball, traded midseason
• Has not regained fastball and pitched even worse since leaving COL (posted negative WAR in CLE in 2012)

Jhoulys Chacin

• This one is tough to include but 2012 gives me no choice, still time to be a success of course
• Excellent rookie season in 2010 (3.1 WAR, 9.04 K/9)
• Posted good but mixed year in 2011. The good: 3.62 ERA, huge GB%. The bad: K/9 took huge step back, did not improve upon horrendous walk rate.
• Ineffective in 2012 due to injury, has only thrown 24.2 innings in 2012

Jury is still out on: Juan Nicasio, Drew Pomeranz, Alex White, Christian Friedrich, Rex Brothers and Matt Reynolds

Now let me be clear: I am not blaming these all on Apodaca; I am merely stating that they all happened during his time as pitching coach. Could Apodaca done anything about Chacin’s shoulder? Who knows? Probably not. Same goes for Francis and others. These types of stories happen all of the time across baseball. A pitcher looks promising and looks to be a contributor to a staff for a 5 year period. And then he doesn’t. This is not unique to the Rockies. However, what we can say is this: when you are developing a young pitcher who shows promise you would like to see him improve, stay consistent, stay healthy, and contribute as a good pitcher for a number of years. What we can say is that has never happened under Bob Apodaca’s decade long stewardship of the Rockies pitching staff save for an average career by Aaron Cook (and even he flamed out). Yes Apodaca took Ubaldo from talented flamethrower to Cy Young candidate, Yes Chacin should have a decent career, yes Francis was good for a few years. But despite all those merits, the Rockies have not developed young pitchers into solid veteran pitchers, which is what the mid-market Rockies must do to contend for the playoffs.

So will Apodaca be able to steer Nicasio, Chacin, Pomeranz, White, and Friedrich into successful major league careers? He might. But with a decade of chances to do so without success, there is enough data to say that someone else should get a chance to develop this crop. Especially since Drew Pomeranz and Alex White have already not shown the progress that would be expected during their short time with Apodaca, I think the organization would be best served to hire a new pitching coach. Apodaca has one hell of a tough job and maybe he has been very unlucky with injuries, but a decade was more than enough time to develop at least a few mainstays in the rotation.

Continue reading »]]> With the difficult May the Rockies have already endured it appears awfully likely that the 2012 version of the Colorado Rockies is not headed to the playoffs. I’m sorry if this is the first time you are hearing this. I believed that the team had a chance to contend for a playoff spot and I thought that Dan O’Dowd actually did a nice job of giving the team a chance in 2012 without sacrificing the young core moving forward. For the Rockies to sniff the playoffs in 2012 a lot had to go right; namely Jhoulys Chacin and Jeremy Guthrie pitching well and the offense going monkey poo for the first few months of the season to carry the young pitching while it found its way. The offense has been good not great, but the pitching really hasn’t given it a chance. So this brings the Rockies what may be a blessing in disguise; knowing early on in the season that the team is selling instead of waiting too long and losing value on the movable pieces as well as the young guys losing valuable experience. Here is the rebuild plan that would be best for the franchise. Note that these are all ideal, not necessarily will work out for other teams to bite on, etc.

1.) Give the young pitching a years worth of MLB experience and exposure to Coors Field. The rotation moving forward should be Juan Nicasio, Drew Pomeranz, Christian Friedrich, Alex White, and Jhoulys Chacin. Nicasio needs a full year to get back in the swing of things after his significant injury and to learn to use his slider against MLB hitters.  Pomeranz needs to string together a bunch of starts (the trade timing and the few odd injuries have made for a tough last 10 months) and try to get some momentum and experience. Friedrich needs a chance to become more consistent and to adjust to MLB hitters. The Rockies need to know exactly what to be able to expect from Friedrich moving forward by the end of 2012.  White would benefit from a full season of learning to trust his stuff and how to sequence his pitches in the Majors. And obviously Chacin needs to get right and get back in there to experience some success (which he hasn’t had for nearly a year now). The most difficult decision the team will have to make is who to move out of the rotation for Jorge De La Rosa.  It may take care of itself through injuries, but hopefully the young pitchers are showing promise and this decision is difficult. All of this means that…

2.) The team needs to part ways with Jeremy Guthrie and Jamie Moyer. I was a fan of the Guthrie trade and I still feel like it would be good if this team had performed well and the plan was still to contend. But given how the season has gone the young pitchers need to get the starts. Guthrie will pull in something respectable via trade (don’t think top prospect though) however Moyer will just have to be cut. This is not quite fair to Jamie; however there is just no upside to having him keep pitching if the team is not contending. Unfortunately he will probably not get picked up and his road will end but it is just best for the Rockies. Heck of a run though.

3.) The team should trade Marco Scutaro. This is another good offseason move that is now irrelevant with the team not contending. Scutaro turns 37 in October and seems to be losing his production anyway. He won’t bring in much via trade but the point is more to give the team some clarification with other guys there. The team has a few options and I am sure the baseball ops already have a plan in place for this. They may want to see once and for all if Chris Nelson is a Major League Baseball player (hint: I think the answer to this question is no). They may want to see how EY Jr. responds to 4 months there. They may want to see how Jordan Pacheco could handle it. They may want to give DJ Lemahieu a solid opportunity to see how he adjusts to MLB pitchers. The one thing I would shudder to see here is to see Jonathan Herrera given the rest of the season there. We know what he brings to the table, and it’s not too much.

4.) The team should trade Jason Giambi. I know he loves the team and being around this group of guys, but he could play a really vital role on a playoff team. He has plenty left in the tank and I think once the Rockies move towards the rebuild he might be open to spending the rest of the summer elsewhere. There are some GM’s that know how valuable he could be in the right role.

5.) Give Wilin Rosario 5 starts a week at catcher. First of all, getting lots of work behind the dish with the young pitchers should give the Rockies enough information to evaluate him as a catcher and to observe if he is progressing. Secondly, he obviously struggles with MLB breaking balls. He has trouble both making contact with the ones that are strikes and laying off the ones that are not. Give him enough at bats to make the adjustment (don’t forget that he missed a lot of games over the last few years) and see if he can make progress there. It won’t help him much to catch twice a week.

6.) Call up Nolan Arenado right away. Why not? Let him get in his growing pains here with the big boys and give him the opportunity to blow us all away. He is young enough that if he has massive struggles it won’t be harmful to put him back into AAA to start next year if he needs it. Let’s see what he’s got.

7.) Consider trading Rafael Betancourt. He is considered a hidden gem among smart baseball guys and has a team friendly contract. There could be numerous bidders and the Rockies could get a significant piece back for him. I say consider only because of the regression of Rex Brothers so far this year. If Rex was tearing it up this year it would be a no brainer.

8.) Move on from Esmil Rogers. Much better to give those opportunities to a Zach Putnam or Josh Outman or Adam Ottavino to see what they can give the team. If another team turns Rogers around so be it. We have zero evidence to be worried about this save for the fact that he has hurled baseballs in the upper 90’s.

9.) Try to trade Todd Helton. Yes this is no fun. And unfortunately to be honest it would be hard to find a willing suitor, but it just seems cruel to put Helton through the 2012 reload year. If a contender will bite, let’s at least give Todd the option to try it somewhere else. This may be moot because I can see him telling the front office that he just wants to end his career as a Rockie and doesn’t want a trade. But the option should be there for him and it would be nice for Tyler Colvin to get a big bunch of at bats at first or right field.

10.) Bat Dexter Fowler lead off every single day for the rest of the year. I know there are legions of Rockies fans screaming about Fowler being put in the 8^th spot due to his higher OBP then the guys hitting 1 or 2, and I get that, but this is less about that and more about seeing Fowler and giving him lots of at bats. Even though he does take a lot of walks (which is great) his approach at the plate can be dreadful for weeks at a time. He needs to get 400 more at bats this year and become more consistent. Give him the job and move on.

This plan will have growing pains and will not get the team to 85 wins. However, there is still plenty of talent amongst the young guys and this team will go on good runs and be fun to watch. This will also give the team the leg up in observation and decision making for the 2013 season and put the organization in the best possible spot moving forward. If the Rockies follow this plan it will be very clear exactly what the team has and what it lacks, and it can put itself in a position to capitalize on the Tulo-CarGo prime for the next handful of years.

Continue reading »]]> In the course of the Rockies season thus far, my naked eye told me that Carlos Gonzalez appeared to take a walk in several situations that profiled as typical aggressive CarGo at bats. Could it be? Is the free swinging Carlos Gonzalez developing plate discipline? Well no. Actually yes. Sort of.

Carlos has 12 walks through 24 games. That is a pace to reach 81 walks for the year. His career high in walks is 48, so sure that does represent added patience. Supporting evidence includes his walk rate, which is on a good trajectory: from a measly 6.3% rate in 2010, up to 8.9% rate in 2011, and currently sitting at 11%. His strikeout rate has remained relatively constant: 21.2% in 2010, down to 19.4% in 2011, and at 20.2% in 2012. These are all good signs. Just imagine: this guy who struck out 135 times while walking only 40 times in 2010 somehow managed a .336 AVG and hit for power… what if he cut down on the free swinging? What could he do then?!

Consider this: the year CarGo hit .336 he swung at 37% of the pitches he saw outside of the strike zone. The league average that year for swinging at pitches outside the zone was 29.3% of the time. So has he improved upon that troublesome figure? A bit.  He cut it to 35.6% last year and it currently sits at 35.6% again this year.

He is where it is going to get a bit weird though: Carlos is still swinging and missing an awful lot. In fact, he is missing more than ever. His 2012 rate for making contact when swinging the bat is only at 68.9% right now, down from 77.6% in 2010 and 76.1% in 2011. That sounds very troubling doesn’t it? But the fact is that Carlos is seeing an absurd amount of pitches outside of the strike zone so far in 2012, only seeing pitches thrown in the zone at an amazing rate of 35.5%! Pitchers obviously know that Carlos will chase, and they seem to be taking that to an extreme when pitching to him. What we are starting to see is pitchers taking that too far. Pitchers are offering Carlos drivel, and the good sign is that he has been able to make the adjustment. The last 3 years he has seen pitches increasingly outside of the zone yet his strikeout numbers have declined. He does have his limits when it comes to chasing pitches, and this will be a troubling development for pitchers.  CarGo has learned to look for his pitch. So far in 2012 he has made contact with 90% of the pitches in the strike zone that he has swung at.  For someone who swings so violently that is a great number. That isn’t someone just making contact; that is 90% contact at strikes with malevolent intent. The results of this are obvious, an OPS of 1.014 so far in 2012.

So while Carlos still swings at junk an awful lot, we should be grateful that even though he keeps seeing more and more junk, he hasn’t increased how often he chases it. That is called making adjustments in Major League Baseball, and that is the only way to have success. It will be interesting to watch how pitchers adjust. He is killing the ball right now even though pitchers have only thrown him balls in the zone 35.5% of the time. Will they throw more strikes to him in hopes of not getting into hitters counts or will they keep the ball away from the zone? If they do, look for Carlos to keep walking while taking advantages when he does see strikes. He could be headed for a monster season with these positive developments this year. Carlos has finally gotten to the point where pitchers really are damned if you do, damned if you don’t.

MLB league wide pitch location 2012:

ESPN Stats and Information

ESPN Stats and Information

Continue reading »]]> The trade for Jeremy Guthrie this offseason was greeted with a crooked eyebrow from Orioles and Rockies supporters alike. When Jason Hammel got off to a great start in Baltimore and Guthrie stumbled out of the gate many Rockies fans quickly soured on the move. While Guthrie has pitched poorly he certainly will end the year with a respectable line and a good number of innings. Of course he will not be anything close to an Ace, but that is not what anyone should be expecting. Guthrie’s early work however does deserve some further scrutiny so we can see just what has been going on so far.

So far in his career Guthrie has thrown fastballs 62% of the time (4 seam 23%, sinker 39%). He has used the slider most frequently among his other pitches (20% of the time), and the changeup 12%, with an occasional curveball mixed in (6%). During his career both of his fastballs have averaged 93.5 MPH.

So far in 2012 though, Guthrie is only throwing his fastball 53% of the time, a very significant change from 62%. He is replacing those fastballs with curveballs and changeups, upping his curveball usage from his career rate of 6% to 15%. Guthrie started throwing the curve more last year, throwing it 9% of the time after only 4% in both 2009 and 2010. In 2009 and 2010 his curveball had very little success, being called a ball47.37% of the time in 2009 and 44.78% of the time in 2010 while resulting in a missed swing only a paltry 2.26% of the time in 2009 and 4.48% in 2010. These are very poor numbers for a pitch. But last year when Guthrie started throwing it more (9% of the time) it was his pitch that resulted in a strike more often than his other 4 pitches, only being called a ball 31.67% of the time, while also increasing the whiff rate on it up to 7.67%. So given this added success with the curveball last year, I can understand why he is throwing it more often, especially while he is adjusting to hitters that he has not seen before.

Watching Guthrie’s 4 starts so far this year, he has also struggled with fastball command, so it could just be that he will get that fastball feel and start feeling more comfortable to attack hitters with fastballs. Here are the locations for Guthrie’s pitches in his first 4 starts below. Fastballs and sinkers are green and blue; obviously it is striking how many of those are not only up and in the middle of the plate, but also missing up out of the zone.

Guthrie’s track record shows that he will throw more fastballs, and he will control it better in the future. Every pitcher has a rough patch or two or three during the season, and Guthrie just happened to choose a terrible time to have his. That being said he has still survived to pitch 24.1 innings in 4 starts; so look for Jeremy to get the fastball command back and have a stretch of steady starts. This trade will look much better in a month or so, rest assured.

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Appreciate what you have and appreciate you get to watch Nicasio pitch after the scary incident last year

The internet is delightful. In fact it is how I watch my beloved Rockies from out of state. The internet is also prone to making us react more quickly and more rashly than we would otherwise. We are all guilty of this. If a baseball fan was to gauge how a team was doing based on the 5% most dedicated fans on Twitter, all 30 teams have terrible GM’s, managers, leadoff hitters, and the team’s top few prospects are obviously better than all of your team’s players. Not to mention that Keith Law and Kevin Goldstein hate every move your team makes and every prospect you have.

Baseball even magnifies this reaction time because we have so much content coming at us. One hundred and sixty two games. That means there are well over 500 hours of baseball to watch for each team. Baseball is odd and beautiful, one day looking like it is impossible to get a hit and the next appearing as though getting a ball by a batter is impossible.

So let us pause, relax, and look back at what we do know and what we don’t know.

What we do know: Juan Nicasio is a miracle. He has made an incredible comeback from breaking his neck and we need to appreciate this every day.

What we do know: Nicasio’s fastball is tremendous. It has an intimidating delivery, above average speed, excellent control, and tremendous late life.

What we don’t know: The Jeremy Guthrie trade was bad. Jason Hammel’s start was solid, but it was also what we have seen of Hammel often. He looks good now, but within his next few starts he will have that incredibly hittable fastball and will be out of the game before the 5th inning.

What we don’t know: That Dexter Fowler will be platooned. You can speculate about this but we just don’t know how much rope the organization will be giving Fowler this year.

What we do know: for the 3rd straight year Dexter Fowler has the chance to perform well and erase all of the other questions and concerns. The organization does not owe it to him to give him 2 months on the big league club to figure out his swing. He needs to take ownership and end this painful tradition.

What we do know: As long as Fowler doesn’t have it going the lineup will not be consistent. Starting a few weeks ago it became apparent that Tracy won’t put Fowler at the top of the lineup until he is clicking, meaning that we can expect to see Fowler at #2, and possibly soon 7 or 8. This combined with a timeshare at 3B will mean at least an unrecognizable lineup every few days.

What we don’t know: That Jaime Moyer will not perform well. I have been dismayed at the incredibly sudden turning on Moyer after one start. Let’s give him 4 more and then evaluate. After all, beyond being 49 he is coming off of Tommy John surgery so he still needs to get comfortable.

What we do know: If Moyer is still pitching in 6 weeks it will not be a positive for the team and organization. The organization is trying to make the playoffs this year, they are not just looking to the future; therefore I understand that the man who performed best in spring won the 5th starter job. That being said if Moyer pitches lights out, his upside is still incredibly low. We don’t know that having Guillermo Moscoso, Tyler Chatwood, or Alex White throwing those innings isn’t best for their development. I like that the younger guys aren’t getting the job just because they need the experience. They need to earn it. But it will not be a good sign if Moyer is still starting in 6 weeks because that means that of all of the young arms we acquired, none of them are improving enough to beat a 49 year old that has had less than 1 WAR four out of the last five years he has pitched. Not a good sign.

What we do know: the Rockies have a unique bench. Having Jason Giambi and Wilin Rosario as pinch hitters is really fantastic. That combo will actually alter how an opposing manager changes pitching. Having Pacheco as a 3rd catcher does allow Tracy to pinch hit Rosario or Hernandez without concern. Eric Young Jr. is an incredible asset to pinch run in late innings. That being said the bench is also unique in that Giambi is not a good defensive 1B, Tyler Colvin is a below average outfielder (nice catch on Sunday though) and there are 2 guys on the bench that don’t have a defensive position: EY Jr. and Pacheco. This means that you will see something like Sunday’s 8th inning. Colvin in right, Cuddyer at 1B, Pacheco at 3B. Yes, Nelson could have been at 3B but he is not good on defense there either. Tracy will have to get creative on these late innings changes until Nolan Arenado comes up.

What we do know: Jim Tracy is willing to put out some odd lineups. As terrible as it sounds to play 5 bench players on one day, it isn’t quite as bad as it sounds given that: Rosario may even be an offensive upgrade, Giambi may be an offensive upgrade, Colvin is probably an upgrade (at this exact moment, no more), and Nelson and Pacheco are both bench players. So while it is odd I don’t think it affected the team’s chance to win as much as it may appear. But either way, if Tracy does this 3 days into the season he will probably do it often.

What we do know: every team has those terrible losses like Sunday’s where the team really should win and a costly mistake snatches defeat out of the jaws of victory. There will be more and thankfully most days there are only around 21-24 hours to stew about it before there is more baseball.

What we do know: That loss on Sunday was still insanely frustrating. Maddening. I mean they had a chance to win the first series on the road, give Nicasio a win after a good start, etc. I am still red about it.

What we do know: More sweet baseball beckons.

Continue reading »]]> I have written previously here about what the future of the Rockies looks like and what needs to go well for the Rockies to compete. In an overall sense, the Rockies need their young pitching to become good. If Chacin, Nicasio, Pomeranz, White, Chatwood, Matzek, Friedrich, and Anderson do not develop then the Rockies franchise will have to chase high dollar free agents to salvage the Tulo-Cargo prime years. That is the future.

The present is a bit different. The Rockies offense will be good this year, good enough to win a World Series if paired with a good staff. If the Rangers, Angels, Giants, Phillies, or a few other teams with good staffs had the Rockies lineup, it would not be hard to imagine them competing for a World Series. So since last year concluded everyone has agreed that the 2012 Rockies will go as far as their starting pitching staff takes them. This is of course true. So how far does the starting pitching staff need to take them to reach the playoffs? What will the Rockies need from this staff?

First of all let’s look at the Rockies franchise precedent. The Rockies have made the playoffs 3 times since the franchise began in 1993. In 1995 the Rockies made the playoffs but it was in a shortened season with a record of 77-67 in a 4 team division and the team obviously slugged its way to that spot (the team ERA was 5.44). The two other times were 2007 and 2009. These were the only 2 years in franchise history that the team has won more than 83 games (90 in 2007, 92 in 2009). So the Rockies franchise has really only had two good years. Let’s look at what happened in those two years.

Every year (except for 2008) since the Rockies moved into Coors field in 1995 the Rockies have ranked at either 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th or 5^th in the NL in runs scored per game. Obviously scoring runs has not been keeping the Rockies from the playoffs. However, every year except for 2007 and 2009 the Rockies have 12^th-16^th in the NL in ERA. The two years the Rockies made the playoffs they pitched significantly better. In both 2007 and 2009 the Rockies ranked 8^th in the NL in ERA (4.65 in 2007, 4.41 in 2009). So to make the playoffs the Rockies pitching doesn’t need to be outstanding, it just needs to be around league average. Over the last 5 seasons the NL wide ERA has been:

Each of the last 5 years the ERA has decreased; as to if we will see that trend continue, who knows? But last year the NL wide ERA was 3.82 and the Rockies team ERA was 4.43, which ranked 15^th in the NL. Last year the team that ranked 8^th in ERA was the Cardinals, at 3.79. Just what would we need from the Rockies starters to get to a 3.79 ERA? Let’s break down the numbers:

• There are 1458 innings to be pitched in a year (discounting extra-inning games and not pitching the bottom of the 9^th in a road loss)
• To get to a 3.79 ERA a pitching staff would give up 613.98 runs over 162 9 inning games.
• The Rockies bullpen had an ERA of 3.91 last year. They also threw the 5^th most innings in the NL (508.2). If the Rockies bullpen repeats the exact same ERA and innings load as last year they would give up 220.8 of the allotted 614 runs.
• That leaves the starting staff with 393 runs left to give up over the other 949.8 innings. This would compute to a starters ERA of 3.72.
• Each rotation spot for the Rockies would need to average 190 innings pitched.

Now here is where it gets interesting. It seems like quite a task to get the Rockies starters ERA down to 3.72 given that last year it was 4.73, but let’s do some toying around to see what it would actually take:

• Jeremy Guthrie has averaged about 206 IP over the last 3 years. Let’s say he gives the Rockies 206 innings and an ERA of 3.90. That uses up 89.3 of the starters allotted 393 runs to give up.
• Let’s say Jhoulys Chacin does give us a 200 inning year. He is able to improve slightly on his career ERA of 3.52 down to 3.45. That would mean he would give up 76.6 of the allotted 393 runs.
• Assuming Juan Nicasio is healthy this year, let’s say he gives the Rockies 180 innings. The sample size of Nicasio’s last year (71.2 IP) is tough, but he did have a 4.14 ERA. If he can average that, he will give up 82.8 of the 393 allotted runs.
• Assuming Drew Pomeranz breaks with the big league club I would guess that he would give the Rockies around 160 innings. We have no idea what to expect as far as an ERA, but for the sake of the exercise let’s say he pitches well as a rookie and has an ERA of 3.90. That would mean he would give up 69.3 of the allotted 393 runs.
• This is where it starts to get tricky. So far, the 1-4 in the Rockies rotation has stayed healthy and met pretty decent expectations above. But there are still 203 innings to be pitched and only 75 allotted runs left to give up, an ERA of 3.33. This would mean the Rockies would need the 5^th man in the rotation to pitch significantly better than the rest of the staff, something that is obviously not going to happen. Can Alex White give the Rockies 203 innings with a 3.33 ERA? Not likely. Guillermo Moscoso? No. Josh Outman? No. Tyler Chatwood? No. A combination of the 3? Certainly not. Even if Jorge De La Rosa came back from injury in July and pitched 100 excellent innings (let’s say 100 innings with an ERA of 3.50) that would leave the need for 103 innings from someone else at the tune of a 3.16 ERA. I don’t see it happening.
• I am not saying that the Rockies cannot make the playoffs, but when we talk about the starting staff taking a step forward, it is a significant step and would need some outstanding performances.
• Here is how it would need to break down:

The above math leaves the Rockies with a few different options to achieve a staff that pitches to the 8^th best ERA (and also a playoff spot) in the NL. Here they are in my estimation:

1. Jhoulys Chacin becomes an ace. If we tweak the above math to give Chacin 215 innings with an era of 3.20, the spot start demand would move to only 88 IP and shift the ERA to 3.72, much more attainable.
2. Juan Nicasio is a force. If we tweak the above math to give Nicasio 200 IP and he has an ERA of 3.50, the spot start demand drops all the way to 83 IP with an ERA of 4.55, which is much more within the hopes of Alex White/ Chatwood/ Moscoso combo.
3. Drew Pomeranz has an unbelievable rookie season. If he gets to 175 IP and has an ERA of 3.35 the spot start demand drops to 88 IP with an ERA of 4.09.

Of these scenarios, I see #2 as most likely.  Nicasio taking a step forward would be the biggest odds changer on the 2012 Rockies. Obviously this assumes that Guthrie pitches well, that everyone stays healthy, and that Jorge De La Rosa is great when he returns; all 3 of those happening are not likely. It will be an uphill road for this staff, however a few other factors are in play that should encourage Rockies fans after reading this. For one, while the offense should be sufficient, it could be outstanding. If Tulo-Cargo stay healthy and Fowler has a breakout year this team could score a lot of runs, changing the demands on the starting staff significantly. The other factor could end up being a large one: the second NL wild card. One team will make the playoffs in 2012 that did not measure up last year; this could lower the bar just enough for this team. But make no mistake about it, this team will not be making the playoffs without either Chacin or Nicasio pitching very well, perhaps even both.

Continue reading »]]> Editor’s Note: This is the second of a two-part post.  The following two paragraphs were the original opening.  Part I can be found here. 

Spring training beckons every year with new excitement for most every team (sorry Astros). Now that the Rockies are now full swing into spring training it is time to look at just what the future holds for this franchise. This is especially timely given that last year the Rockies traded the only pitcher in franchise history that baseball might consider an ace, right in the midst of his prime years. Given that the Rockies did that, what are the plans for the future? An examination of all of the transactions the Rockies have made beginning with the Ubaldo trade will show just what this team is up to.

The Rockies were exceptionally busy this offseason. After the Jeremy Guthrie trade it looks like 15 men from last year’s opening day 25 man roster will not be with the Rockies. That is a lot of deals to analyze, and perhaps more importantly, a lot of deals that cannot be judged independently once you know that the plan to overhaul was so expansive. So let’s look at the moves and look at what could happen—both for the better and for the worst. GM’s are smarter than the collective baseball blogosphere gives them credit for; they know what the upside and downside of each deal is and they are in the business of taking calculated risks. A plan for the future is just that- a plan. Results are not givens. Here is the future, both with things bouncing the Rox way and with the universe not cooperating.

January 5^th: Rockies sign Casey Blake for 1 year/$2 million

Best case scenario 1: Blake performs well enough that the Rockies see the benefit of not having a giant black hole at the hot corner for the first time in a few years. He is solid, especially for the bottom of the lineup and he graciously steps aside when Nolan Arenado comes up in July. Arenado hits well and becomes a good hitter from 2013-2020, including some all-star years.

Best case scenario 2: The Rockies decide to leave Arenado in the minors for 2012 (save for a September call-up) and Blake plays the whole year, providing solid play far and above what Ian Stewart offers in Chicago.

Worst case scenario: Blake just runs out of gas or gets injured. This either forces the Rockies to play someone at third base most of the year who doesn’t quite fit (LeMathieu or Pacheco) and the production is far below average, forcing the Rockies to bring up Arenado before he is ready and it regresses his development.

January 16^th: Seth Smith for Guillermo Moscoso and Josh Outman

Best case scenario: Guillermo Moscoso wins a rotation spot in spring training and performs well.  He is traded before the deadline because he is expendable after Jorge De La Rosa comes back from injury. The return on him is a bullpen arm and a great young prospect. Outman becomes a left-handed force coming out of the bullpen in 2012 and is just an unhittable LOOGY, filling that role from 2012-2015. Seth Smith continues to hit well, but only against righties.

Worst case scenario: Moscoso’sfly ball tendencies kill him in Colorado and he spends 2012 in the minors. By 2013 the Rockies have plenty of 5^th starter candidates and he is traded for next to nothing… to the Oakland A’s. Outman never really regains his command after Tommy John surgery and shows promise, but just keeps walking too many people and becomes a bullpen liability, but not before giving up some devastating performances a la Felipe Paulino. Seth Smith is given a full season of opportunities against lefties and makes enough strides that he is one of the more effective right fielders in the AL.

January 21^st: Marco Scutaro for Clay Mortensen

Best case scenario: Scutaro plays well, hits .300 and solidifies the lineup. With the combination of him and Casey Blake playing well the Rockies have good production from 2 positions that killed them last year, leading the baseball world to praise Dan O’Dowd for slotting in these guys as one year fixes in a way that allowed them to compete in 2012 without giving up any future performance. Josh Rutledge takes the second base job in 2013.

Worst case scenario: Scutaro gets injured and LeMathieu underperforms in his stead.

February 7^th: Jeremy Guthrie for Jason Hammel and Matt Lindstrom

Best case scenario: Guthrie is renewed by playing competitive baseball again. In 2012 he has a 3.80 ERA and succeeds despite his lack of strikeouts. He loves Colorado (and being near his offseason Utah home) and signs a 3 year deal with the Rockies. He is the Rockies 4^th starter from 2013-2015. Hammel gets crushed in Camden Yards with the high level of competition and never really breaks through. He becomes what Guthrie was: the AL pitcher with the most L’s at the end of the year. Lindstrom is an average bullpen man.

Worst case scenario: Guthrie gives up loads of homeruns at Coors and just gives the Rockies an average 2012 season. He signs elsewhere in 2013. Hammel taps into the mojo we saw come and go and becomes a solid pitcher who somehow regains his out pitch. Lindstrom becomes a solid 8^th inning guy and the Orioles flip him at the deadline for a good prospect.

Rockies future best case scenario

Two of the young arms that O’Dowd got in the Moscoso, Outman, Chatwood crop become contributors of some sort. Pomeranz and White are good. Nolan Arenado is a stud. Josh Rutledge becomes a good second baseman. Wilin Rosario is good. JhoulysChacin continues to make strides and the Rockies enjoy a 4-5 year period where they contend, with an offensive core of Tulo, CarGo, Fowler, Arenado, and Rosario and a pitching core of Pomeranz, Chacin, White, Nicasio, and Matzek. Not a bad bargain in my estimation.

Overall 2012 Offseason worst case scenario

Of the 5 young pitchers acquired during this period (Pom, White, Moscoso, Outman, Chatwood), only 2 of them contribute, and not at a high enough level to forget how well Ubaldo is pitching. The young position players (Arenado, Rosario, Fowler) underwhelm and Tulo- CarGo continue to make up the bulk of the offense—which, when combined by the disappointing young pitchers, is not enough to contend.

What is the plan?

The plan is to depend on the solid youthful core or the franchise. However, I think O’Dowd has put the structure of veterans in place (Scutaro, Blake, Hernandez, Cuddyer) to make the transfer to that youth more competitive than some assume. At the end of the day it is a bit like reliving the 2007 season: young and talented pitching that is unproven and inexperienced (Ubaldo, Franklin Morales) along with top notch (but again unproven) young position players (Ian Stewart, Tulowitzki, and Seth Smith). This is going to be exciting to watch, and with a few things going their way, this Rockies team could be a force. But the plan is for this team to use the blessing of having Troy Tulowitzki and Carlos Gonzales both in their primes to contend for a World Series each year from 2013-2017. With a few good bounces, it just might happen. Here is the lineup and pitching rotation for those years:

Rockies core 2013-2017

CF- Dexter Fowler

2B- Josh Rutledge

LF- Carlos Gonzales

SS- Troy Tulowitzki

3B- Nolan Arenado

RF- Tim Wheeler

C-  Wilin Rosario

1B- Cuddyer in 2013+14; prospect/FA 2015-2017

1- Drew Pomeranz

2- JhoulysChacin

3- Juan Nicasio

4- Alex White

5- Jeremy Guthrie

Others contributing (perhaps stealing a job above) during 2013-2017: Jorge De La Rosa, Chad Bettis, Tyler Anderson, Christian Friedrich, Tyler Matzek, Peter Tago, and Edwar Cabrera, Chatwood, Moscoso.

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